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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL K. MILLIGAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

COCA COLA BOTTLING
COMPANY OF OGDEN,

Case No. 9161

a corporation, and

SAFEWAY STORES, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT
SAFEWAY STORES, INC.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Daniel K. Milligan, hereinafter referred to as ((Milligan", plaintiff below, brought this action against the Coca
Cola Bottling Company of Ogden, one of the defendants
below, hereinafter referred to as ((Bottling Company" and
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Safeway Stores, Inc., the other defendant below, hereinafter
referred to as ((Safeway".
At the pretrial, Safeway moved for a Summary Judgment on the ground that the pleadings and deposition of the
plaintiff showed that Safeway was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law (R. 15). This motion was granted (R.
17). Counsel for plaintiff did not appear at the pretrial,
having advised the trial judge that he would stand on his
complaint.
For the purpose of convenience the record will be referred to by ((R". We will refer to Milligan's deposition
by HD".

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A few days prior to February 27, 1959, Milligan purchased two cartons of Coca Cola from the Safeway Stores,
Inc., at 24th Street and Monroe, Ogden, Utah. The Safeway store at that location is a self-service store (D-13).
Plaintiff selected the cartons of ((coke" from a stack or
shelf in the store and paid for them at the check stand
(D-15). He took the cartons to his home, placing them
in the fruit room (D-15) . The fruit room is located at
the end of Milligan's garage which is attached to his house
(D-1 0). The door to the fruit roof was not locked with a
key (D-12) . On some occasions plaintiff's garage door
was left open while his car was parked in the garage (D-12).
Milligan purchased the cartons of ((coke" for a birthday
party (D-40) . On the night of the party, about February
27th, Milligan had some relatives over who felt free to go
out to the fruit romn and get their own ((coke" (D-45).
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All of the bottles of Coca Cola purchased at Safeway were
consumed between February 27, 1959 and March 31, 1959,
except one. On the evening of March 31, some five weeks
after the Coca Cola had been purchased, Milligan went to his
fruit room and got the last bottle of ((coke" (D-17). Milligan had consumed about half of the contents of the bottle
when some object lodged in his throat (D-8). Milligan's wife
drove him to the hospital where a physician groped around
in this throat causing him to swallow the object (D-9).
The X-rays taken at the hospital disclosed that Milligan had
swallowed a square paper clip (D-9). The last X-ray taken
disclosed that the paper clip had entered Milligan's big
colon and that was the last trace of it (D-9). A second
paper clip was found in the bottle of Coca Cola when it
was examined by a laboratory technician at the hospital (D17). Milligan remained at the hospital one night and was
taken home the next afternoon. Milligan never did inform
Safeway that the bottle of Coca Cola which he drank in his
home on the evening of March 3 1, 19 59, contained two
paper clips (D-15) .
Milligan's complaint against Safeway and the Bottling
Company was grounded on three theories: ( 1) res ipsa loquitur; (2) violation of the adulterated food statutes; and
( 3) implied warranty. On the basis of the facts and the
law applicable to Milligan's theories the trial court granted
a motion for Summary Judgment as to Safeway.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THERE IS NO INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
ARISING AGAINST SAFEWAY UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
POINT II
SAFEWAY DID NOT VIOLATE THE FOOD,
DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT OF UTAH.
A. THE SALE• OF ADULTERATED FOOD IS
NOT NEGLIGENCE PER SE.
B. SAFEWAY HAD .A GUARANTY FROM
THE BOTTLING COMPANY WHICH MAKES
THE FOOD, .DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT
INAPPLICABLE TO SAFEWAY.
POINT III
MILLIGAN FAILED TO GIVE SAFEWAY NOTICE OF THE BREACH OF WARRANTY AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 60-3-9 U. C. A. (1953)
WHICH IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO HIS
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SAFEWAY.
POINT I
THERE IS NO INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
ARISING AGAINST SAFEWAY UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
The Bottling Company manufactured the bottle of
((coke" and sold it to Safeway. Safeway then sold the bottle
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to Milligan who stored the bottle in his fruit room for approximately five -weeks before he opened it. These facts are
uncontroverted. They conclusively show that Safeway did
not have the necessary control over the bottle of Coca Cola
to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The Supreme Court of Utah has analyzed and applied
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a number of cases. See
3, U tab Law Review 113, rryhe Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine
In Utah." In the case of Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 117 Utah 578, 218 P. 2d 660, 52 A. L. R. 2d 108,
this court held that:
cc • • • the only time that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor should apply to a csealed product' in the latter category is when the plaintiff has shown that there
was an absence of opportunity for tampering so that
in effect the court could conclude that there was
extended control over the product by the manufacturer until it reached the ultimate consumer; or when
the product passes directly from the manufacturer
to the .consumer without passing through intermediate
hands."

Under the holding of the Jordan case, supra, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not be applied to Safeway
because it did not have control over the bottle from the
time it was bottled until it reached the ultimate consumer.
In the case of Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Company,
3 Utah 2d 283, 282 P. 2d 1045, this court held that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to a situation
when the plaintiff, employed by the cement company as powder man, was injured by a .cap and stick of dynamite of
defendant's manufacture that exploded as he placed them in
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the drill hole. There was no evidence as to how or why the
dynamite exploded, no evidence as to when or how it was
manufactured and none as to how or by whom it had been
handled or treated prior to use. There was evidence that
the plaintiff handled the dynamite in a manner other than as
recommended by instructions which accompanied the containers in which they were packaged.
The court rejected plaintiff's theory of res ipsa loquitur
and made the following statement:
ctPlaintiff urges that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable under the circumstances recited.
We cannot agree. To do so would be to impose absolute liability and insurability upon manufacturers
of explosives and perhaps most any other commodity.
To do so would be to extend the fact or fiction of
control necessary to invoke the doctrine to an unreasonable, impractical and unrealistic degree, where
mere injury could dispense with plaintiff's burden of
proving a defendant's negligence, even where it would
be impossible for defendant to show freedom therefrom.
Safeway submits that to extend the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to a food retailer would uinvoke the doctrine to
an unreasonable, impractical and unrealistic degree where
mere injury could dispense with plaintiff's burden of proving
defendant's negligence."
It appears from a review of the Utah cases that this is
the :first time this court thas been confronted with the question of whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be
applied to a retailer of foods as distinguished from the bottler
or mmzufacturer.
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The Jordan case supra has been annotated in 52 A.L.R.
2d at page 117. At page 122 the annotator makes the following observation:
HAs to whether a submissible case on the question of negligence on the part of a retailer (as distinguished from a bottler or manufacturer) of a
beverage sold in a sealed container is made out by
proof of the presence of a foreign substance in the
beverage, there is relatively little authority. Holdings
both ways are to be found, but it seems fairly safe
to state that, because of the remoteness of the retailer's
activities from the contents of the containers of beverages he sells, very few courts would hold that he
could be .charged with negligence on evidence showing
no more than the presence of a foreign substance in
a beverage sold by him; indeed, the paucity of decisions dealing with the retailer's negligence would appear to reflect a recognition of this fact by plaintiffs'
counsel, if not by plaintiffs themselves."
While the annotator states that ((holdings both ways
are to be found", an examination of the annotation shows
that there are only two Georgia cases where it has been held
that a retailer could be found negligent by the trier of the
facts when there was proof of a foreign substance in a beverage sold in a bottle or other sealed container. Each of these
cases have been over-ruled. In Davis v. Williams, 198 S. E.
357, (Georgia 1938) the Court of Appeals of Georgia Division #I held that a presumption of negligence on the part
of the retailer of coca cola arose from proof that a bottle of
coca cola sold by the retailer contained particles of glass.
Also, in Cordell v. Macon Coca Cola Bottling Co., 192 S. E.
288, (Georgia 1937) the Court of Appeals of Georgia Division #1 held that whether defendant retailer was guilty of
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negligence in selling a bottle of Coca Cola which contained
flies was a question of fact for the jury. However, in
the later case of Moree v. Shiver, 12 S. E. 2d 118 (Georgia
1940) the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division #2, held
that it was error for the court to instruct the jury that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable to a retailer of a
bottle of Coca Cola which contained pieces of glass. In the
Moree .case, supra., the plaintiff brought suit against the Albany Coca Cola Bottling Company and Moree, the retailer
of the bottle. With regard to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the court said:
uThe [trial] court charged, as applicable to
both defendants, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
and that the jury could consider whether this doctrine applied. In the bottling company case we held
that the charge was not error as to the bottling company. The evidence presents a different situation as
respects the applicability of this doctrine to the case
as against Moree. As, from the nature of the case,
the act of Moree in serving to the plaintiff a bottle
of coca cola with glass in it, which Moree did not bottle but which he bought from the bottling company,
could not in itself be negligence, but would be negligence only when done under circumstances which
would show negligence on the part of Moree, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable. It
was therefore error for the court to give in charge
this doctrine as applicable to the case as made against
Moree."
In the Moree case supra, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division #2, refused to follow the earlier decisions pronounced by Division # 1 of the Court of Appeals. In view
of the decision in the Moree case, supra, the only cases hold-
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ing that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
tailers have been over-ruled.

1S

applicable to re-

The annotation points out that the absence of cases
against retailers indicates that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is not applicable to a purveyor of food. The reason for not
applying the doctrine to a retailer of food in a ((sealed container" is that it does not have control over the container
when it is filled and sealed. In the absence of evidence that
the retailer was in fact negligent in tampering with the bottle or leaving the bottle where it could be contaminated, it
cannot be held liable on the theory of res ipsa loquitur merely
by proof that a bottle contained a foreign substance which
injured the plaintiff.
Thus, in the case of Blount v. Houston Coca Cola Bottling Company, 185 So. 241 (Miss. 1939), plaintiff brought
suit against the manufacturer and retailer of a bottle of Coca
Cola for personal injuries. The evidence disclosed that the
plaintiff became ill after drinking a part of a bottle of
Coca Cola, which contained a portion of a mouse or bird in
the bottom of the bottle. The trial court gave a peremptory
instruction in favor of the retailer. The Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that the instruction was proper stating:
((The peremptory instruction in favor of the retailer was correct, since the suit as to both the manufacturer and retailer was predicated on alleged negligence, and not on an implied warranty as to the
wholesomeness of the beverage and there were no
facts shown that would constitute negligence on the
part of the retailer, or from which negligence could
be inferred."
Also, in the case of Wilkes v. Memphis Grocery, 134 S.
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W. 2d 929 (Tennessee 1939) the C0urt of Appeals of Tennessee held that the evidence was insufficient to present a
jury question as to a retailer's negligence when there was
nothing in the appearance of a bottle which would have
put the retailer on notice that it was unfit for human
consumption. Here plaintiff brought suit against the bottler
and retailer for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from
drinking a bottle of Pepsi-Cola which contained dead flies
and other foreign substance. At the conclusion of plaintiff's
proof defendant's motions for directed verdicts were granted.
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that the directed
verdict as to the retailer was proper stating:
((As to the other defendants, there is no proof
of negligence, or any facts shown upon which a reasonable inference of negligence could be based. The
retailer is not liable to the consumer under any implied warrant of food products that are purchased
by him in the original containers and sold at retail
to a customer, where there is nothing in the appearance of the package or the container that would put
him upon notice that it was impure or unfit for
human consumption."
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is founded on at least two
elements: ( 1) The accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence,
and (2) it must be caused by an instrumentality under the
control and n~anagen'tent of the defendant. 3 U tab Law
Review 114. Appellant states in his brief: ((As has been pointed out in cases which will be cited herein the requirement of
exclusive control is that the bottling cmnpany have exclusive

control at tbe tiJne the deleterious substance is introduced
into said bottle. The appellant recognizes that the Bottling
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Company and not the retailer has control at the time the
bottle is filled and launched on its commercial course. It is
at this time when a foreign substance is most likely to be
introduced into the bottle in the absence of direct evidence
of tampering. In order to hold the retailer negligent under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the fact finder would have
to indulge in unfounded speculation that some prankster
tampered with the bottle while it was in the control of the
retailer. Such speculation is just as unwarranted against the
retailer as it is against the consumer. The trial court properly ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to Safeway.
POINT II
SAFEW.AY DID NOT VIOLATE THE FOOD,
DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT OF UTAH.
A. THE SALE OF ADULTERATED FOOD IS
NOT NEGLIGENCE PER SE.
Section 4-26-3, U. C. A. ( 1953) states:
((Prohibited acts.-The following acts and the
causing thereof within the State of Utah are prohibited:
1. The manufacture, sale, or delivery, holding
or offering for sale of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.
2. The adulteration or misbranding of any food,
drug, device, or cosmetic.
3. The receipt in commerce of any food, drug,
device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded,
and the delivery or proffered delivery thereof for pay
or otherwise. ::· ::· *"
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111 the Utah case of Niemann vs. Grand Central Market, Inc., 9 Utah 2nd 46, 337 P. 2d 424, this court held that
the Adulterated Food Statute could be used as a basis for a
civil suit against a seller of foods. The court made the following observation:
((This Utah statute is representative of legislative
pronouncements enacted to protect the public health
by the imposition of legal sanctions upon those who
purvey, for public consumption~ adulterated food.
To fully implement this intent these statutes are construed so as to best effectuate their purpose. Prior in-

terpretatio11s of this type statute have stated that civil
liability is based on the same elements as criminal
liability and may be based simply upon proof of violation of sucb a statute and violation may result even
though there be no knowledge of the food's harmful
propensities on the part of those responsible for its
sale." (Italics ours)
According to the language used by Justice McDonough,
civil liability is based on ·the same elements as criminal liability and may be based upon proof of violation of such a
statute.
In the Nie1nann case supra plaintiffs brought suit for
damages resulting from trichinosis allegedly contracted from
meat sold by the defendant. Plaintiff purchased ground beef
from defendant's market. The meat was mixed with raw egg
and eaten uncooked by the plaintiffs. Some ten days later
the plaintiffs were afflicted with trichinosis. Trichinae larvae, which cause this disease, are found only in raw pork,
among the foods commonly eaten by man. Plaintiff's evidence showed that defendant's meat department ground both
beef and pork with the same grinder and that beef was often
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ground after pork sausage had been processed. Although
defendant's employees testified that the grinder was dismantled and cleaned after use with a different type of meat,
plaintiff contended that the defendant failed to properly
clean the grinder after pork had been ground, allowing particles to become mixed with the ground beef. The case was
submitted to the jury with the instruction that sale of ground
beef containing pork which is infested with trichinae larvae
is a violation of the Utah statute prohibiting the sale of
adulterated foods. A jury verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed by the court.
The ratio decidendi of the Niemann case is that the
defendant market sold to plaintiffs ground beef which contained trichinae infested pork and this meat caused the damage complained of. The defendant's negligence was in failing
to properly clean the meat grinder. The defendant market
was, in effect, the manufacturer and there was sufficient
evidence upon which the jury could find negligence. It is
submitted that the holding of the Niemann case is not
authority for the proposition that the sale of an adulterated
food, in and of itself, is enough to constitute negligence per
se.
In the case of Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 3 5,
327 P. 2d 822, this court held that a supplier of pork was

not absolutely liable under the adulterated food statutes for
selling unfinished pork to a retailer when the retailer was
to complete the processing. The evidence in the Suhnnann
case disclosed that the supplier of pork had informed the
retailer that he could not continue to supply processed pork,
but the retailer requested the supplier to continue the shipments and that he, the retailer, would finish the processing.
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This court held that even though the supplier knew that
unfinished pork was dangerous and might contain trichina,
that the supplier, in the absence of knowledge that the retailer
was selling unfinished pork to the public, was not liable to
the retail customer who contracted trichinosis from eating
pork. The court stated:
((The second contention is that the selling of uncooked pork containing trichina violates Sees. 4-20-5
and 8, U. C. A. 19 53, prohibiting the sale of impure
and adulterated food products. Plaintiff avers that
violation thereof results in absolute liability, even
without proof of negligence. On those two points this
further observation is pertinent: this product, although potentially dangerous in one stage of its processing as are many food products, is quite harmless
if the preparation for consumption is completed. Under the circumstances here described, the supplier was
entitled to assume that reasonable care and prudence
would be exercised in regard to the product and was
not obliged to anticipate that it would be handled by
the retailer in a manner which was dangerous or in
careless disregard of the safety of others."
This court recognized that even though there was a sale
by the supplier of an adulterated food that there was not a
violation of the statute where the supplier ((was entitled to
assume that reasonable .care and prudence would be exercised
in regard to the product and was not obliged to anticipate
that it would be handled by the retailer in a manner which
was dangerous or in careless disregard of the safety of others."
This court refused to accept plaintiff's argument that a
technical violation of the statute results in absolute liability
even without proof of negligence. Even though there was a
sale by the supplier to the retailer of an adulterated food,
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the supplier was not liable when he could assume that the
retailer would finish the processing.
Safeway was also entitled to assume that the Bottling
Company had exercised reasonable care and prudence in the
handling of its product. Safeway was not obliged to anticipate that the bottling process had been conducted in
such a manner that a foreign substance was introduced into
the bottle.
B. SAFEWAY HAD A GUARANTY FROM THE
BOTTLING COMPANY, WHICH MAKES THE FOOD
AND DRUG ACT INAPPLICABLE TO SAFEWAY.
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic .Act of Utah provides that
a retailer may protect itself from the prohibitions of the Act
by procuring a guaranty or undertaking signed by and
containing the name and address of the person residing in
the State of Utah from whom he received the article to the
effect that such article is not adulterated. The statutory
language is as follows:
Section 4-26-5: ((Violation-Misdemeanor-Defenses-Dissemination of Advertising - 1. Any person
who violates any of the provisions of section 4-26-3
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
2. No person shall be subject to the penalties
of subsection 1 of this section, for having violated
subsection 1 or 3 of section 4-26-3 if he establishes
a guaranty or undertaking signed by, and containing
the name and address of, the person residing in the
state of Utah from whom he received in good faith
the article to the effect that such article is not adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of this act,
designating this act. * ::· ::·"
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Safeway had a guaranty from the bottling company
which fully conformed with the statute. (R 28-29)
The guaranty statute (Section 4-26-5 U.C.A. 1953)
shows a legislative intent to afford sellers a means of protecting themselves from liability when they sell food or drink in
a sealed container.
The statute providing the seller with an opportunity to
obtain a guaranty from the food bottler or manufacturer
shows that liability may be charged to the party who packed
the food originally. The fact that this statute states that the
seller having a guaranty signed by and containing the name
and address of the person residing in the State of U tab from
whom he received in good faith the article to the effect that
such article is not adulterated, shows that the legislature intended that the manufacturer or packer of the goods should
be responsible to the ultimate consumer and not the seller. The
requirement that the guarantor must reside in Utah indicates
that a resident of the State of Utah could bring suit here and
would not be charged with the onerous task of sueing in a
foreign state. The principal that where one of two innocent
parties should bear a loss the party who initiated the instrumentality whi.ch caused the loss should respond underlies the
reasoning of the guaranty statute. Justice McDonough in the
N ehnann case supra stated that civil liability is based on the
same elements as criminal liability and may be based simply
upon proof of violation of such a statute. The statute construed by the court in the N eimann case supra was a criminal
statute. A guaranty, by relieving the seller of the penalties
imposed by the statute, relieves the seller of any criminal
liability. If there is no criminal liability which can be imposed
upon the seller, then, the reasoning of Justice McDonough
would indicate that there is no ground for civil liability.
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The cases cited by appellant in his brief are not applicable to the question before this court regarding the effect of
the guaranty statute (Section 4-26-5 U.C.A. 1953). In none
of the cases referred to by appellant was there an express
legislative pronouncement that a party could be relieved of
a violation of a statute by obtaining a guaranty. On the other
hand, in the case of Donaldson vs. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea C01npany, 199 S.E. 213, the Supreme Court of Georgia
stated that where a food retailer had a guaranty from the
manufacturer the retailer would not be guilty of negligence
per se even though he sold adulterated food.
In the Donaldson case supra an action was brought by
Mrs. Donaldson for injuries resulting from the consumption
of alleged unwholesome food purveyed by the defendant. The
evidence showed that the defendant sold some pig's liver to
the plaintiff's daughter, which was on the same day cooked
and eaten by the plaintiff's family, all of whom became ill
on the following morning. Plaintiff's suit was grounded upon
a violation of the Georgia statute which provided in part:
((Section 105-1101 Georgia Code- Any person
who knowingly or carelessly sells to another unwholesome provisions of any kind, the defect being unknown to the purchaser or his family, shall be liable
in damages for such injuries."
The Georgia Pure Food and Drug Act also provided:
((Section 42-115, Georgia Code - No dealer
shall be prosecuted under the provisions of this title
when he shall establish a guarantee signed by the
wholesaler, jobber, manufa.cturer, or other party residing in the state from whom he purchases such articles, to the effect that the same are not adulterated
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or misbranded within the meaning of this title designating them. :".- ::- *"
The Supreme Court of Georgia noted that plaintiff's
petition alleged that the pig's liver was in a deleterious and
unwholesome condition and unfit for food. The court stated
that these allegations were sufficient to show a violation of
the duty imposed by the statute not to sell ((adulterated" food
as defined therein. That court then made the following statement:
~~The first question includes reference to Section
4 2-115 (statute concerning guaranty) . That section
does not impose any duty whatever upon a seller of
foods, or upon any one. It merely provides that no
dealer shall be prosecuted under the provisions of the
statute if he shall establish a prescribed guaranty
signed by the person from whom he purchased. Un-

der this section a dealer selling food which is adulterated within the meaning of the statute would not
violate its provisions, and there/ore would not be
guilty of negligence per se, if he had obtained the
prescribed guaranty; but the guaranty would not relieve him.from the liability referred to in Section 1051101 (statute imposing liability for selling adulterated food), if he is negligent as a matter of fact, in
selling unwholesome food by the use of which another
is injured. It follows that Section 42-115 (statute concerning guaranty) merely creates an exception to the
statute in favor of those who obtain and establish the
guaranty; and the plaintiff in this case was not required to negative such exception in her petition; its
existence in a particular case being a matter for defense." (Italics ours) .
The language of the Donaldson case supra that a retailer
selling adulterated food would not be negligent per se if he
had the prescribed guaranty was quoted with approval in the
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later Georgia case of Burns vs. Colonial Stores, 83 S.E. 2d 259.
In that case plaintiff and his wife purchased some meat at
defendant's store. The plaintiffs prepared the meat in a
goulash and after it was consumed the plaintiffs became ill.
The plaintiff brought suit against defendant charging that:
(a) the defendant sold food to the plaintiff which contained
added poisonous and deleterious ingredients rendering it unfit
for food, thus being negligence per se as a violation of the
Georgia Code; (b) sale of adulterated food consisting of
filthy, decomposed and putrid animal substance, thus being
negligence per se as a violation of the Georgia Code; and other
acts wherein the defendant had failed to warn the plaintiff of
the meat's condition, and not inspecting the meat when it was
sold to the plaintiff. With regard to the question of the
guaranty obtained by the defendant grocery store from the
supplier of the meat the court quoted the following language
from the Donaldson case:
((Under this section a dealer selling food which
is adulterated within the meaning of the statute would
not violate its provisions, and therefore would not be
guilty of negligence per se, if he had obtained the
prescribed guaranty; ::- ,z. ::-"
The court noted, however, that the defense to the charge
of negligence per se of having obtained a guaranty was raised
neither by the pleadings nor by the evidence in the case. The
court stated that it was error for the court to charge the jury
that such a guaranty would be a defense to plaintiff's complaint where the guaranty was neither pleaded nor proved.
In the case at bar, Safeway presented the guaranty agreement to the pretrial judge. The guaranty was discussed at the
pretrial. Counsel for Safeway urged that no civil liability
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could be imposed upon Safeway, in view of the fact that the
guaranty had eliminated Safeway's criminal liability.
Through oversight this guarantee was not introduced into
evidence at the time of the pretrial. However, by subsequent
motion and notice the trial judge admitted the guaranty into
evidence and it is now contained in the record at uR" 28-29.
Safeway contends that the guaranty statute of the State of
Utah shows a legislative intent to relieve sellers of liability for
the sale of adulterated foods. It is submitted that in the case
at bar there is no violation of the statute by Safeway and,
therefore, the statute is not applicable to this defendant.
POINT III
MILLIGAN FAILED TO GIVE SAFEWAY NOTICE
OF THE BREACH OF WARRANTY AS REQUIRED
BY SECTION 60-3-9 U.C.A. (1953), WHICH IS A
CONDITIO·N PRECEDENT TO HIS CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SAFEWAY.
The Sales Act imposes a duty upon a buyer of goods to
give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or
warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows or
ought to know, of such breach. The Act provides that if the
buyer does not give notice of such breach, then the seller shall
not be liable therefor.
Section 60-3-9, U.C.A. (1953) provides:
((Acceptance does not bar action for damages.ln the absence of express or implied agreement of the
parties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall
not discharge the seller from liability in damages, or
other legal remedy for breach of any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But if, after

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice
to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty
within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or
ought to know, of such breach, the seller shall not be
liable therefor." (Italics ours)
The deposition of Milligan clearly shows that he did not
give Safeway notice of the breach of any warranty.
Mr. Thatcher:
(tQ. Did you ever report this incident at the store?"
Mr. Milligan:
(tA. No, sir."
Safeway knew nothing of the alleged breach of warranty
until it was served with a copy of the summons and complaint.
In Mawhinney vs. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P. 2d 769,
this court stated that timely notice is a vital condition precedent to an action for breach of warranty. In that case the
plaintiff buyers, brought suit to recover the value of personal
property which they alleged was fraudulently removed from
the premises between the time of the execution of an earnest
money agreement and the final uniform real estate contract
for the sale of a hotel owned by the defendants. One of plaintiff's .claims to recover damages for the shortage of personal
property was based on the theory of a breach of an express
warranty. The complaint stated that one of the defendants
((represented and warranted to the plaintiffs that all of the
stock that was on the premises at the time of the execution of
the earnest money agreement was still there or had been replaced.* * *"Plaintiff's second cause of action was framed as
a breach of warranty arising from the failure of the heating
system on the premises to conform to the standard of quality
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imputed to it by the defendants. This Supreme Court stated
that the pleadings upon the two causes of action dealing with
warranty were defective because they did not show that the
plaintiff buyers had given notice to the seller of the breach of
warranty. This Court stated:
((The pleading upon these two matters is fatally
defective as a matter of law under the Sales Act
adopted in Utah. Section 81-3-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides in part: (But if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice to
the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty
within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or
ought to know, of such breach, the seller shall not be
liable therefor.'
((A survey of the cases on this matter shows that
timely notice is a vital condition precedent to an action for breach of warranty." (Italics ours)
The court concluded that defendant's demurrer was
properly sustained on the two claims for breach of warranty.
Although the Mawhinney case supra did not treat the
problem of the sale of food under an implied warranty, the
cases applying the statute requiring notice to the seller of a
breach of warranty, uniformly hold that a buyer of food
seeking to hold the seller on the theory of implied warranty
must give reasonable notice of the breach of warranty.
In the case of Vogel vs. Thrifty Drug Company, 272
P. 2nd I (Sup. Ct. of Calif., 1954) an action was brought to
recover for personal injuries resulting from glass present in
an ice cream soda served plaintiff by the defendant drug
company. Plaintiff's original complaint was grounded only in
negligence. On the day the case was to go to trial the plaintiff
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served the defendant with a copy of a proposed amendment
to her complaint. The defendant objected to the amendment
to plaintiff's complaint and the trial court denied plaintiff's
motion to amend. The question before the Supreme Court
was whether the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff to amend her complaint. The amended
complaint stated a new cause of action based on the theory of
breach of an implied warranty of fitness upon which the
plaintiff relied in eating the ice cream. The court noted that
the pleading did not contain a direct allegation nor did it allege facts from which an inference could be drawn that the
notice required by the California Code (identical to Section
60-3-9, U. C. A. 1953) was given. Plaintiff argued to
the California Supreme Court that all the facts necessary
to support a recovery upon the theory of implied warranty were set forth in the amended complaint and that
she was therefore entitled to have the warranty theory submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court stated that in making
that argument plaintiff overlooked an essential element to
stating a cause of action for breach of implied warranty, i.e.,
an allegation that plaintiff gave notice of the breach to the
defendant within a reasonable time. The court set out the
notice statute referred to above and then made the following
observation:
((One of the purposes of the provision in the U niform Sales Act was to ameliorate the harshness of the
common law rule in some states that the mere acceptance by or passage of title to the buyer of the
goods constituted a waiver of any and all remedies
for breach of warranty, and at the same time to give
the seller some protection against stale claims by
requiring notice. ::· ::· * The sales act on its face clearly
applies to the sale of food *::·* for immediate human
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use or consumption. ::- * :-. . In determining that there
in an implied warranty that the food is fit for· human
consumpiton under the statutes. dealing with the law
of the sales of goods, it is accepted that the sale of
food for immediate human consumption is a sale of
goods under the statute.' It further appears (The clear
and practically unbroken current of authority establishes the doctrine that the requirement of notice, to
be given by the vendee charging breach of warranty,
is imposed as a c&ndition precedent to the right torecover and the giving of notice must be pleaded and
proved by the party seeking to recover for such
breach.' " (Italics ours)
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to permit. the plaintiff to amend its
complaint.

DeLucia vs. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Connecticut, 89 A. 2d 749 (Sup. Ct. of Errors of Conn. 1952) is a case
which illustrates the general rule that the notice statute is
applicable to the sale of foods. In this case the plaintiff became
ill after drinking a bottle of Coca Cola. He sued the bottling
company alleging two causes of action, one grounded in negligence and the other in breach of contract. The trial court
found for the defendant on the plaintiff's theory of negligence and found for the plaintiff on his theory of breach of
contract. The defendant appealed, claiming that it was not
notified of the breach of contract and that in the absence of
such notice the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
The defendant admitted that it impliedly warranted that
the beverage was fit for human consumption. The court discussed the facts and concluded that there was no evidence in
the record to support a finding that plaintiff notified de-
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fendant of the breach of an implied warranty. The court
stated:
ttThe warranty, which the defendant concedes it
impliedly gave, attached to the purchase of the beverage by virtue of the Sales Act. General Statutes
6630. A section of ~hat act provides, in part, that
tif, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to
give notice to the seller of the breach of any * * :~o
warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer
knows or ought to know of such breach, the seller
shall not be liable therefor.' 6664. This section sets
up a condition precedent to a buyer's right to recover. 3 Williston, Sales (Rev. Ed.) p. 39. The buyer
must plead and prove the giving of notice." (Citing
cases) (Italics ours)
The court held that inasmuch as the plaintiff had failed
to plead or prove notice of the breach that he was not entitled
to recover on his theory of breach of contract.
In 46 Am Jur p. 43 8, the following rule is enunciated:
((Statutory Requirement of Notice. - In practically every jurisdiction the provisions of the state
statute requiring notice of breach of warranty are the
same as §49 of the Uniform Act. The courts uniformly hold under such statutory provisions requiring notice of breach of warranty (within a reasonable time after the buyer knows or ought to know of
such breach,' that as a prerequisite to a recovery for

a breach of warranty, the purchaser must give notice
to the seller of such breach within a reasonable time
after he knew or under the circumstances should have
known of the breach.'' (Italics ours)

An annotation contained in 71 A.L.R., p. 1149, states
that the courts uniformly hold that under the notice section
of the Sales Act requiring a notice of breach of warranty
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((within a reasonable time after the buyer knows or ought to
know of such breach" that, as a prerequisite to a recovery for
breach of warranty, the purchaser must give notice to the
seller of such breach within a reasonable time after he knew
or under the circumstances, should have known of the breach.
Milligan failed to make any allegation in his complaint
that notice was ever given to Safeway of a breach of an implied warranty. The record conclusively shows that the
plaintiff never did notify Safeway of the incident which took
place in his home on the evening of March 31, 19 59. The
cases and rules referred to above demonstrate that Milligan's
failure to give notice of the breach of warranty precludes any
cause of action against Safeway on the theory of implied
warranty. The cases state that the giving of such notice is a
condition precedent to a cause of action against the seller
and that in the absence of an allegation of notice in plaintiff's
complaint he has no cause of action against the seller on the
theory of implied warranty.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts in this case show that the bottling
company manufactured a bottle of coca cola, sold it to Safeway, who in turn sold it to Milligan. The bottle of ttcoke"
was in Milligan's possession for approximately five weeks be~
fore it was opened. In order to impose liability on Safeway,
Milligan must show that Safeway violated some duty or
breached a contract. It seems obvious that Milligan cannot
invoke a doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to show a violation of a
duty. Safeway did not have the necessary control to warrant
the application of the doctrine. Neither can Milligan show a
violation of a duty by use of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
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Act. Safeway had the prescribed guaranty which relieves it
of any violation of the Act. Safeway is not liable to Milligan
for breach of an implied warranty. Milligan failed to comply
with the mandate of the statute that notice of a breach of
warranty must be given to a seller within a reasonable time
after the buyer knows or ought to know of such breach. Such
notice was a condition precedent to a claim against Safeway
for breach of implied warranty. Safeway was the ccmiddleman" in this transaction and should not be liable to Milligan
under any theory.
In the case of Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific Railroad
Company, 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 2d 339, this court stated that
if disputed issues of fact would not establish a basis upon
which plaintiff could recover, no matter how such issues were
resolved, summary judgment should be entered for the defendant. Even if the issues of fact are viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, Safeway was entitled to a summary
judgment as a matter of law.
The order granting the motion for summary judgment
as to Safeway was proper and should be affirmed.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER
Attorneys for Safeway Stores, Inc.
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